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STS: A Structural Theory of Sets 
ALEXANDRU BALTAG 
ABSTRACT. We explore a non-classical, universal set theory, 
based on a purely "structural" conception of sets. A set is a trans-
finite process of unfolding of an arbitrary (possibly large) binary 
structure, with identity of sets given by the observational equiv-
alence between such processes. We formalize these notions using 
in:finitary modal logic, which provides partial descriptions for set 
structures up to observational equivalence. We describe the com-
prehension and topological properties of the resulting set-theory, 
and we use it to give non-classical solutions to classical para-
doxes, to prove fixed-point theorems that relate recursion and 
corecursion, to formalize "super-large", reflexive categories and 
"super-large" circular models, and to provide "natural" solutions 
for domain equations. 
1 Introduction 
In this paper we consider infinitary modal logic as a foundational lan-
guage for set theory. The paper summarizes, from a modal logic point-
of-view, most of the results contained in the author's Ph.D. Dissertation 
(Baltag 1998). Due to length restrictions, we eliminated almost all proofs 
and many related results from the present version. 
Modal logic, endowed with the Barwise-Moss- semantics (defined in 
Barwise and Moss (1996)), is a natural tool for providing partial descrip-
tions for set-structures. Barwise and Moss have proved that infinitary 
modal logic can be used to characterize every set in classical set theory 
ZFC and in Aczel's Antifounded set theory ZF A. Here we apply modal 
logic to define a notion of observational equivalence between structures, 
and use this notion to axiomatize and model a non-classical universe of 
sets, containg a "universal set" U and other "large" sets. This universe 
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can be seen as the largest extension of the well-founded universe that 
still preserves the above-mentioned property of modal characterizability. 
The main axiom of our system ST$ ("Structural Theory of Sets") is 
a strengthening of Peter Aczel's Antifoundation Axiom (AF A), stated 
in terms of modal descriptions. Our axiom of "Super-Antifoundation" 
(SAFA) basically says that every maximally consistent class of infini-
tary modal sentences characterizes some set. The existential half of the 
axiom can be understood as a strong Reflection Principle for modal logic. 
It implies both very strong Comprehension principles (namely the so-
called Generalized Positive Comprehension Principle proposed by Forti 
and Hinnion (1989), and Forti and Hansell (1992a), and Strong Infin-
ity axioms (e.g. the existence of inaccessible cardinals, Mahlo cardinals 
etc.). The sets in this universe can be identified with complete theories in 
infinitary modal logic. Most of the definitions and proofs of relevant set-
theoretical properties have a modal character. The main set-theoretical 
operations and relations have natural modal counterparts. Our consis-
tency proof for this theory of sets uses an infinitary generalization of the 
standard "canonical model" construction for modal logic. Under cer-
tain assumptions (the existence of a weakly compact cardinal), one can 
show that this is indeed a model for our theory. Moreover, the model 
is isomorphic to one of the most interesting models for a universal set 
theory that has been proposed in the last years, by researchers working 
on topological hyperuniverses (see Forti and Hinnion 1989, Forti and 
Honsell 1992a). 
One can show the resulting universe is very well-behaved from a set-
theoretical point of view: it properly extends Z FC and Z FA, in the 
sense of containing standard models for these theories; it is closed un-
der classical set-theoretical operations and it actually has much stronger 
closure properties; it has interesting fixed point properties, that gener-
alize and unify the known recursion and corecursion theorems for An-
tifounded set theory Z FA; as mentioned above, it satisfies very strong 
Comprehension principles. 
This Structural Theory of Sets can be used for foundational purposes, 
to provide a principled explanation for the classical set-theoretical para-
doxes and a justification for the axioms of ZFC, as well as for some 
"large cardinal" axioms. It provides in a uniform manner models for 
many recursive and corecursive domains, which could be used for giv-
ing denotational semantics for programming languages, in the Scott-de 
Bakker style. Our set theory can be also taken as a basis to develop 
category theory notions of a high level of generality and reflexivity (e.g. 
the category of all categories). In the same time, this universe of sets 
seems to be a good candidate for a general framework to study seman-
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tical paradoxes, one that would generalize the "circular model-theory" 
approach to paradoxes in Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), and Barwise 
(1996). 
2 Antifoundation and Modal Logic 
The "structure-forgetting metaphor" was proposed by Barwise and Moss 
(1991), as a motivating intuition for Aczel's Antifoundation Axiom 
(AFA) and as an alternative to the so-called "box" metaphor under-
lying the familiar iterative conception of set. In the iterative picture, 
sets were built in stages (corresponding to the ordinals), by putting to-
gether previously constructed sets as in a box. The structural metaphor 
is in some sense the "dual" of the box metaphor: sets are seen to be the 
result of a process of successive decompositions of a given object, succes-
sive unfoldings of its internal structure. The idea is that sets are what 
is left when we take an aggregate (a complex object) and we abstract 
everything but its structure. By forgetting the nature of the components, 
the only thing that remains is the aggregation/disaggregation relation 
between the whole and the components, i.e. the membership structure. 
This structure is pointed, in that it has a root: the underlying process 
of unfolding the structure, by successive decompositions, has a starting 
point, namely the very object under consideration. So we look at sets 
as pointed binary structures. This is the same notion as the one of a 
Kripke structure with a distinguished world, or a model-world pair , as 
it is usually called by authors working on modal logic. 
One can think of this conception as turning the familiar iterative 
picture on its head: instead of starting at the bottom and building sets 
in stages, as collections of previously given objects, we are now presented, 
from the start, with a unified totality (an "object"), which we analyze 
into its constituents, which in their turn are to be analyzed. . . and so 
on. By forgetting everything but this "pattern of unfolding" we obtain 
a set. 
Observe that under this conception there is no reason to limit the 
possible structures to wellfounded ones. A "possible world" containing 
infinitely divisible objects is surely conceivable - and this is enough for 
mathematics, regardless of whether the real world is "atomic" or not. 
So the classical Axiom of Foundation has to go. But there still are some 
limitations on the kind of binary structures sets are. The most important 
restriction comes from the very principle of abstraction we assumed: the 
identity of sets should be given by nothing else but the structure itself. 
This does not reduce set-identity to simple structural isomorphism, be-
cause of the untyped character of the set concept: the components are 
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themselves regarded as being sets. In other words, sets are structures 
composed of sets. In this way one obtains a notion of structural equiv-
alence. We shall refer to this relation as observational equivalence, since 
we think of the above analysis as a series of observations performed on 
the object in question. As we shall see, there are various ways to define 
this notion. 
Working in zpc-, i.e. the system obtained by eliminating the axiom 
of Foundation from Zermelo-Fraenkel's system ZFC, Peter Aczel has 
defined the notion of a bisimulation between two structures. Bisimilar-
ity can be defined more generally for pointed binary structures. In the 
universe of zpc-, the only binary structures available are the binary 
graphs, which are defined as sets of ordered pairs of objects. A pointed 
{binary) graph G = (go, R) is a pair consisting of a binary graph Rand 
a root (or a "point") g0 . A bisimulation between two graphs is a relation 
~ between their nodes, having the property that if two nodes are re-
lated by ,....., then every immediate successor of one of the nodes is related 
by cv with some immediate successor of the other node. A bisimulation 
between two pointed graphs is just a bisimulation ,..., between the two 
graphs, which relates the two roots. Two pointed graphs are bisimilar if 
they are related by a bisimulation. 
Bisimilarity is Aczel's notion of observational equivalence. Observe 
that one can associate to each set a some unique pointed graph Ga, with 
the accessibility relation given by converse membership 3, and the root 
given by the set a itself. Then we can define two sets to be bisimilar if 
their corresponding graphs are bisimilar. We write a cv b to denote the 
fact that the sets a and b are bisimilar. 
But there exists an alternative definition for observational equiva-
lence, in terms of infinitary modal logic: indeed, the modal language is 
the natural language to describe graphs (Kripke structlires) up to bisim-
ilarity. Working inside zpc-, Barwise and Moss (1996) have consid-
ered the infinitary modal sentences, as partial descriptions for sets and 
graphs. The class L 00 of infinitary modal sentences is defined as the 
least class closed under negation •, the modal operator 0 and infinitary 
conjunction f\. The definition for truth (or satisfaction) is the familiar 
one for Kripke structures. Given a pointed graph G = (g, R) we write 
(g, R) f= cp instead of the standard notation g f=c cp. The modal the-
ory of a pointed graph G is the class th(G) of all the modal sentences 
satisfied by G. 
By transferring this definition to sets, via the above-mentioned "iden-
tification" of sets a with their converse-membership graphs Ga, one ob-
tains the: 
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Barwise-Moss semantics for modal logic. The relation a f= cp of 
satisfaction of a modal sentence cp on a set a is defined recursively 
by: a f= ''P iff a J:C rp; a f= /\<Ii iff a f= cp for all <p E <Ii; a f= Orp iff 
a' f= <p for some a' E a. The modal. theory of a set a is the class 
th(a) of all modal sentences satisfied by a. 
One can now define a notion of modal equivalence , or observational 
equivalence between structures (graphs or sets): two objects (pointed 
graphs or sets) are said to be observationally equivalent if they satisfy 
the same modal sentences; i.e. if their modal theories coincide. In this 
case, we write a = b for sets, G = G' for pointed graphs, and a = G for 
observationally equivalent pairs of sets and pointed graphs. From now 
on we shall simply refer to the relation = as observational equivalence, 
and we shall distinguish it from Aczel's relation of bisimilarity "'· In 
the more general context we shall consider later, the two notions are 
indeed distinct. On the other hand, it is well-known that in the context 
of Z pc-, the modal notion of observational equivalence is equivalent 
to Aczel's notion of bisimilarity: In Z pc-, two objects (graphs or sets) 
are observationally equivalent (in the modal sense) iff they are bisimilar. 
The above considerations on set identity as observational equivalence 
lead naturally to the following strengthening of the classical axiom of 
Extensionality: 
Strong Extensionality (Aczel): Observationally equivalent (bisimi-
lar) sets are identical. In modal terms: sets are characterized by 
their modal theories; i.e. if th(a) = th(b) then a= b. 
This axiom basically says that sets are uniquely determined by the modal 
descriptions of their membership structure. This gives a clear-cut iden-
tity to Aczel's sets. The above discussion on the structural metaphor 
suggests that strong extensionality should be the only limitation im-
posed on the set structures. This leads to a maximality principle, stating 
that, up to bisimilarity, every pointed binary structure can be seen as a 
set. This is the existential half of Aczel's axiom of Antifoundation: 
Existential AFA: Every po'inted graph is observationally equivalent 
(bisimilar) to some set. 
By Strong Extensionality, the set mentioned in this statement is unique. 
So, putting together the last two axioms, one obtains a version of Aczel's 
main postulate: 
Antifoundation Axiom (AFA): Every pointed graph is observation-
ally equivalent (bisimilar) to a unique set. 
This statement seems to perfectly capture the structural conception of 
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set: sets are just pointed graphs modulo observational equivalenc,e (bisim· 
ilarity). Aczel's system Z FA is obtained by adding the Antifoundation 
axiom AFA to Z Fe-. 
Against Z PA, one ca.n argue that the acceptance of the a.xioms of Z PC-, 
as the ba.ckground of our set theory, imposes an artificial limitation-
of-size on the kind of structures sets a.re. Our understanding of binary 
structures as graphs, that is sets living in the universe of Z Fe-, restricts 
our choice for set-structures. In particular, the axioms of Replacement 
and Separation force our structures to be small; the sets obtained by col-
lapsing these structures in accordance to APA will be hereditarily smalL 
As it wa.s observed by Barwise and Moss in Vicious Circles, it seems that 
Z PA can be best understood as a general theory of hereditarily small 
sets. Indeed, if we adopt the structural conception, then the iterative 
justification for the axioms of zpc- (in particular for Separation) is 
no longer available: sets are not built up from below in a wellfounded 
manner, but are obtained by collapsing arbitrary structures. The only 
justification for Z pc- comes now from the older "limitation-of-size con· 
ception of sets" (Fraenkel, von Neumann): a class is considered to be a 
set iff it is not too big. Indeed, to accept the axioms of Replacement and 
Separation means to postulate that all sets are small. 
But one can argue that, from the point of view of the structural 
conception, the "smallness" condition looks unnatural, a simple a.rtifact 
of the way we usually represent (pointed binary) structures as sets in 
Z pc-. It actually goes against the "maximality" principles embodied 
by AF A, by imposing again an ad-hoe restriction to the possible set· 
structures. Even worse, this limitation is of a non-structural nature: size 
ill not a structural characteristic in the sense described above, since it 
is not preserved by bisimilarity (or by any reasonable notion of observa-
tional equivalence). Indeed, one can construct graphs of arbitrarily large 
size, which are nevertheless bisimilar to a given graph with only one 
node. Limitation of size is hence contrary to the spirit of the "structure-
forgetting" metaphor. 
3 A Structural Theory of Sets: STS 
In this paper we explore what happens if we take the structural notion 
of set at face value, and we consequently drop any size restriction. The 
problem of finding such a theory was explicitly asked by J. Barwise and 
L. Moss in their book Vicious Circles (1996), in the chapter sugges-
tively entitled Wanted: A Strongly Extensional Theory of Classes. As an 
attempt to answer this call, we present an axiomatic system STS (Struc-
tural Theory of Sels}. We use the standard language of Set Theory, with 
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variables for sets. Sets are not assumed to be necessarily small. We also 
use classes as a "manner of speaking" extensionally about unary predi-
cates (which might not define any sets). The class of all sets is denoted 
by U. We also postulate the existence of two classes V and Sat. The 
first is intended to be the class of all wellfounded sets and so a model 
of ZFC; the second is the relation of satisfaction of a modal formula 
by a set. We shall assume that the class of all sets U is an extensional 
universe satisfying some very mild closure conditions (under singletons 
and finite unions). The class of wellfounded sets V is needed for con-
structing partial descriptions for structures, i.e. to define the class £ 00 
of infinitary modal sentences. We assume V satisfies all the axioms of 
z FC. A set is said to be small if it is of the same size as some set in V. 
Inside V, one can define the collection On of all ( von Neumann) ordinals 
in the usual manner. 
Let us list here all the axioms mentioned above, which constitute 
what might be called the "classical core" of our system STS: 
Classical Axioms 
(Al) Extensionality 
(A2) Closure of the universe U under singletons and finite unions: if 
a, b are sets then {a}, a U b are sets. 
--- (A3) A set is in V i:ff all its elements are in V. In other words, the class 
V is transitive and closed under subsets: PV = V. 
(A4) Vis a model of the axioms of ZFC. 
Let us mention here that for the resulting system, obtained by adding the 
axioms mentioned in the next section, we do not need all the assumptions 
included in the axiom (A4) above. Namely, only need to assume that V 
satisfies the classical axioms of Infinity, Replacement, Union and Choice. 
The fact that V will also satisfy the other axioms of Z FG follows from 
our main axiom SAFA (to be introduced in the next section). 
Next, we define our notion of {binary) structure. By dropping the 
limitation-of-size condition, we return to the pre-set-theoretical ("logi-
cal") notion of structure: a binary structure is just a binary relation R, 
given by some formula. Set-theoretically, this can be still represented as 
a class of pairs, but not necessarily as a set, be it small or not. This 
is a completely naive conception of structure. If we also fix a "root", 
- we obtain the class-analogue of a pointed graph: the notion of pointed 
system. This concept has been studied in the context of Z FC and Z FA, 
but not as a central notion. We shall take it as the basic logical notion 
underlying the concept of set. 
Formally, we define a pointed system as( a pair of a "root" set and) 
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a class of pairs (i.e. a binary relation, not necessarily representable by a 
set). A (pointed) graph is a small (pointed) system. One can easily see 
that every (pointed) V-graph is isomorphic to a (pointed) graph that 
belongs to V. 
Let us now suppose for a moment that we agreed on a suitable definition 
of the notion of observational equivalence between pointed systems. In the 
next section, we will discuss this notion and argue that, in the case of 
possibly large pointed systems, the useful concept of equivalence is given 
by modal equivalence, and not by the usual definition of bisimulation. 
But we postpone this discussion for now and just assume as given a 
notion of observational equivalence. 
The essence of the "unrestricted" structural conception of set can be 
now captured by the following statement: 
Sets are just arbitrary pointed systems modulo observational 
equivalence. 
In our system STS, this will be expressed by the following AF A-like 
theorem: 
Weak SAFA: Every pointed system is observationally equivalent to a 
unique set. 
This was our initial formulation of our main axiom SAFA ("Super-Anti-
foundation Axiom"), designed to replace AF A in the context of a theory 
of arbitrarily-sized strongly extensional classes. We shall call this state-
ment Weak SAFA, since it is weaker than the final formulation of SAFA 
(to be presented below). The uniqueness half of Weak SAFA is just (the 
modal version of) Strong Extensionality: observationally equivalent sets 
are identical. The existential half ("every pointed system is equivalent 
to some set") is a strengthening of the existential AF A. We note here, 
without proof, that the correspondent formulation in terms of bisimula-
tion is inconsistent (when stated for pointed systems in full generality), 
since it leads to the classical set-theoretical paradoxes! But, as we shall 
see, our formulation in terms of observational (modal) equivalence is 
consistent. 
4 Modal Descriptions and Super-Antifoundation 
Let us turn to the problem of choosing the right notion of observa-
tional equivalence between pointed systems. As announced, we claim 
that Aczel's bisimilarity relation captures this notion only for small sys-
tems (graphs). It is not appropriate for large systems, since it is based 
on the unwarranted assumption that we can use one of the systems as a 
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whole to describe or simulate the other. Let us suppose we first observe 
the roots go, g~ of the two systems; next, we are presented with an imme-
diate successor of g~ in the second system, and we have to match it with 
some immediate successor of go in the first system. But this assumes one 
is given a complete picture or list of the collection of all the immediate 
successors of go. This is not a natural assumption when defining a notion 
of observational equivalence between large systems. 
A more realistic assumption is that at each step we only have access 
to a list of partial descriptions of all the immediate successors. The list 
can only use descriptions that have already been constructed; hence, 
even if the collection of all the successors is large, the collection of their 
descriptions will be small. But this means we are not matching a node 
with another node, but a description of a node with another description. 
Both might actually refer to many distinct nodes. 
After w many steps, we might have to continue this process of un-
folding the structures: we now have available more descriptions of the 
immediate successors of the initial roots. We obtain a transfinite se-
quence of unfoldings, which can be interpreted as a series of analytical 
experiments performed on the initial object (set or pointed system). Two 
objects will be observationally equivalent if they have the same pattern 
of unfolding. 
Observe the underlying temporal metaphor: as in the iterative pic-
ture, we need a "logical" concept of Time, given by an unending suc-
cession of ordinal stages; but these are no longer stages of construc-
tion, but stages of discovery. The idealized mathematician is no longer 
the builder of the mathematical universe, only its explorer: sets are the 
''ideal record" of his activity of analyzing objects into pieces. This can 
be related to what Keith Devlin , in his book on The Joy of Sets (1993) 
wrote about Antifoundation as being based on an analytic approach to 
set theo.ry, in contrast with the synthetic approach of the iterative con-
ception. 
On the other hand, one can see that the analytic approach presup-
poses the synthesis: the outcome of an "observation" or experiment is 
a partial description of the object in question. To analyze something is 
to actually construct a new object, as a (partial) unfolding of the initial 
one, a (possibly incomplete) representation of its structure. The explorer 
has to record somehow the results of his explorations, accumulating all 
his past and present information in a database: a box. Each of the data 
gathered in the box is itself a partial description of the intended ob-
ject: another box. In this sense, the iterative universe is the "shadow" of 
the analytic universe, its trace of unfolding: when we explore the "real 
world" of sets-as-structures, we simultaneously build the wellfounded 
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universe of boxes-inside-boxes, as a way to encode the partial informa-
tion gained in the first process. The stages of discovery a.re also stages 
of construction (of "theories" or databas~). The wellfounded sets play 
here the role of "linguistic objects", descriptions of the intended (possi-
bly non-wellfounded) structures. But in the same time they are "real" 
objects in themselves, being a part of the intended universe. 
So we formally encode these partial descriptions as particular kinds 
of wellfounded sets, called (infinitary) modal sentences. These are gen-
erated by the following three basic ways of building step-by-step partial 
descriptions for set-structures: 
(1) Negation: given a possible description t.p and an object a, we con-
struct a new description -it.p, to capture the information that t.p 
does not describe a. 
(2) Conjunction: given a set 4> of descriptions of the object a, we ac-
cumulate all descriptions in q, by forming their conjunction A 4>. 
(3) Unfolding: given a description t.p of some member (or members) of 
a set a, we "unfold" the set a by constructing a description Ot.p, 
which captures the information that a has some member described 
by t.p. 
Observe that the first two operations refer to sets-as-objects and generate 
the language of infinitary propositional logic. The third is the most basic 
way of "analyzing" or unfolding a set: we just unwrap the box and pick 
up (the description of) some thing inside. The language L 00 generated 
by these three operations is called infinitary modal logic . One can con-
sider this logic as a fragment of L00w, the standard first-order language 
with infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions. One can easily define the 
infinitary modal language L00 , by recursion inside V, by encoding in 
some canonical manner the symbols ...,, !\, 0 by some well-founded sets, 
and then encoding a model sentence by a string made of the codes of all 
its symbols. 
We can define the dual operators V, D in the usual manner, and also 
introduce some other useful operators: 
Ocp 
-. { Ot.p : t.p E cp} 
Ocp 
-. { Ot.p : t.p E cp} 
t.p /\'If; -. /\{t.p,'lj;} 
t.pV'lj; -. v{t.p,'lj;} 
One can also define these modal descriptions for pointed systems (and 
graphs). The resulting description relation coincides with the Kripke 
semantics for infinitary modal logic. We call this relation satisfaction. 
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For pointed graphs in V one can define the notion of satisfaction by the 
usual recursive definition. As mentioned above, if we identify each set a 
with its converse-membership binary structure Ga, then this definition 
corresponds to the set-semantics for modal log'ic, (described in section 
2 and) defined in the more restricted case of Z FA by J. Barwise and 
L. Moss in Vicious Circles. In this sense, modal sentences can be seen 
indeed as giving partial descriptions for sets. The only problem is that we 
cannot make this into a formal recursive definition for arbitrary sets or 
pointed systems. The reason is that we have not assumed any principle of 
E-recursion for arbitrary sets or classes, and actually there is no place for 
such a postulate in a non-wellfounded set theory: recall that E-recursion 
is equivalent to the Foundation axiom. 
Instead of a recursive definition, we just postulate the recursive condi-
tions corresponding to the set-semantics, as axioms. For this, we assume 
the existence of a special class (i.e. binary predicate) Sat, as a class of 
pairs (a, cp) of sets a and modal sentences tp. We shall of course write 
a f= 'P instead of (a, 'P) E Sat. 
Satisfaction Axioms 
(A5) a f= --.ip iff a~ r.p 
(A6) a f= /\<I> iff a f= r.p for all cp E <I> 
(A 7) a f= Oip iff a' f= cp for some a' E a. 
One can then easily extend this notion of satisfaction to classes and 
to pointed systems, in such a way that the above recursive conditions 
remain valid. We also define as above the modal theory th(a) of the set 
a. 
Now we can define observational equivalence as identity of all the 
partial descriptions: 
Definition 4.1 Two ''objects" (sets, classes or pointed systems) are 
said to be observationally equivalent if they are modally equivalent, i.e 
they satisfy the same infinitary modal sentences. We write a = b to 
express the fact that the sets a and b are observationally equivalent, and 
similarly we write A= B, G = G' a:::: B, a:::: G etc., for pairs of classes, 
pointed systems, sets and classes etc. 
A modal theory is said to be consistent if all its members are satisfied 
by the same structure (pointed system or graph). The theory is said to 
be weakly consistent if all its sub-sets are consistent. The assertion that 
every weakly consistent theory is consistent is equivalent to a "large car-
dinal'' assumption (that of the existence of a weakly compact cardinal). 
In the previous section, we have mentioned "vVeak SAFA" as our 
initial formulation of our main axiom SAFA, generalizing Peter Aczel's 
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Antifoundation axiom. For set-theoretical reasons (namely the desirabil-
ity of having a universe of sets closed under some specific operations, 
like infinitary union), one needs to strengthen Weak SAFA a little bit. 
Namely, it is easy to see that the existential side of Weak SAFA is 
equivalent to the claim that every consistent modal theory is satisfied 
by some set. From an intuitive point of view, weakly consistent theories 
are just theories whose consistency could be proved if we would as-
sume the above-mentioned large cardinal hypothesis. It is thus natural 
to strengthen Weak SAFA to obtain our main axiom: 
Super-Antifoundation Axiom (SAFA) Existence: every weakly 
consistent modal theory is satisfied by some set. 
Uniqueness (Strong Extensionality): every set is characterized by 
its modal theory. 
This completes our axiomatic system ST S. 
5 Correspondence between Sets and Modal Theories 
It is easy to see that SAFA implies the following statement. The func-
tion th, mapping every set a to its modal theory th(a), gives a bijective 
correspondence between sets and maximally weakly consistent modal 
theories. One can make this bijection into an isomorphism, by defining 
an accessibility relation between theories, as in the canonical model con-
struction in standard modal logic. For T, S maximally weakly consistent 
theories in £ 00 , we put: 
T -t S iff V<p(<p ES::::} Or.p ET). 
Then one can prove the following 
Proposition 5.1 For all sets a, b, we have: 
aEb iff th(b) -t th(a). 
In words: the above-mentioned bijection is an isomorphism between the 
E-structure of the universe of sets and the accessibility structure between 
maximally weakly consistent modal theories. 
So one could say that a set is just a maximally (weakly) consistent the-
ory in infinitary modal logic. As an immediate application, we obtain a 
number of results, which we will now list. 
The Existence of a Universal Set. Let T be the following theory: 
T =: { Or.p : rp is a consistent modal sentence } 
Then it is easy to check that T is a weakly consistent theory. So, by 
SAFA, there must exist some set, call it U, such that U f= T. So T 
must be included in the characteristic theory th(U) of U: T ~ th(U). 
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Let now a be an arbitrary set. Any sentence ip E th(a) is consistent (since 
a f= ip), and so Oip ET s;;; th(U) (by the way we have defined T); hence 
Oip E th(U) for every ip E th(a), which by definition means that we have 
th(U) -r th(a) (since both are maximally weakly consistent theories). 
By the above result, this means that a E U, but a is just an arbitrary 
set, so the set U coincides with the universal class: U = {x: x is a set }. 
Consistency of STS: The Canonical Model. The above-mentioned 
correspondence gives the idea for proving the consistency of our system 
STS: working in ZFC with an appropriate large cardinal assumption 
(the existence of a weakly compact cardinal l'C), we can define the modal 
logic LK, having only conjunctions of size less than l'C, construct its canon-
ical model formed of all maximally weakly consistent theories of size at 
most l'C, and interpret the canonical model as a universe of sets, with 
membership defined by the accessibility relation. This construction gives 
a model of the system STS. We skip the details of the construction, 
which can be found in the author's Ph.D. Dissertation (Baltag 1998). 
Modal Definability 
Definition 5 .2 For a modal theory (class of modal formulas) <I> , the 
class defined by <I> is the class { x : x f= <I>}. A class is said to be modally 
definable if it is the class defined by some theory <I>. 
Notations. For modal theories <I> and w, we use the following notations 
Di.I> -. {Dip : <p E <I>} 
<]?- D 
-· { <p : Dip E <:P} 
<I> - <> 
-. { ip : O<p E <:P} 
<I> /\ w -. {VJ/\'1/;: <p E il?,'1(; E W} 
<I> v w -. {YJV'1/J: <p E il?,'1/; E '1!} 
<Po -. 0 (<I>- D) 
<I>o -. 0 (il?- 0) 
D<I> -. Oil> U { OYJ : ( -,1P) tj <f>} 
cl(<f>) -. {'1/;: <I> f= '1/;} (the deductive closure of <I>) 
The operations /\ and V can be generalized to infinitary ones, for indexed 
families of theories. D is the definability operator, since one can check 
that 
A f= Dif? iff A is defined by if? . 
The Comprehension Principle for Modal Theories is provable in our sys-
tem: 
Lemma 5.3 Every infinitary modal theory if? defines a set {x: x f= <I>}. 
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Sets Maximally consistent Deductively closed theo-
theories ( characterizabil- ries ( definability) 
ity) 
a T = cl(Dill) cI> = cl(T- u) 
b s iv 
{ai : i E J} {Ti: i E J} { illi : i E J} 
{a°':a<>.} {T°': a<>.} {ill°': a<>.} 
Operations Axioms for the corre- Axioms for the corre-
with sets sponding characteristic sponding defining theory 
theory 
niEJ ai D (LJiEJTi- ~ LJiEJ q>i 
n0<<>. a°' D (/\"'<>-.ill;;- ) /\°'<>-. ill°' 
LJ°'<>. aa D (Va<). <:P;;- D) Va<>. <Pa 
Pa D(To) Ocf> 
LJa (T- D)o U (T- o)o cp- 0 
{a} OTUOT Dill 
Relations Relations Relations 
aEb s- u ~ T (or T ~ s- 0 ) D'P 2 iv 
a~b T- 0 c s- 0 q> 2 iv 
(or s--D ~ T- 0) 
TABLE 1 
But the converse is also true, showing that Modal Comprehension is 
enough to generate all the sets: 
Lem.ma 5.4 Every set is definable by an {infinitary) modal theory. 
Putting these together, we obtain the following characterization of sets-
as-classes: 
Proposition 5.5 A class is a set iff it is modally definable. 
This gives us a new bijection, between sets and deductively closed the-
ories, given by mapping each set to the deductive closure of one of its 
defining theories: put Th(a) =: fr E L 00 : b f= <p for every b Ea}. This 
gives the announced bijection, having the inverse Th-1 ('1>) =: {x: x f= 
it!} (the set defined by the theory cl>). The theory Th(a) will be called the 
defining theory of the set a, to be distinguished from the characteristic 
theory th( a) of the set a (introduced above as "the modal theory of a"). 
It turns out that both these two correspondences th and Th, "natu-
ral" set-theoretical operations correspond to "natural" operations with 
theories; see Table 1. 
Table 1 "shows" that the universe U is closed under small unions, 
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arbitrary intersections, powersets, set-unions, singletons. 
Generalized Comprehension. Modal Comprehension implies appar-
ently much stronger comprehension principles: Define the class of infini-
tary generalized positive formulas (GP F 00 ) as the least class containing 
all atomic formulas x E y, and closed under infinitary conjunctions and 
disjunctions, quantifiers \:/, 3, and also under the following rule: if c.p is 
GPF 00 , and (} is any formula in Loew which has x as its only free 
variable, then both \:/x E Y'P and Vx(B -t c.p) are GPF00 • 
One can prove in ST S the following strong comprehension theorem, 
which is a strengthening of a model-theoretic result by Malitz, Weydert 
and Forti: 
GPF00-Comprehension : For every formula c.p(x) E GPF00 , having 
x as a free variable, the class { x : c.p( x)} is a set. 
As an easy consequence, the universe of sets U is closed under the fol-
lowing operations: pairs, small unions, set-unions (i.e. if a is set then 
U a is a set), powers et, arbitrary intersections, inverse, domain, range, 
projections, composition, image, small Cartesian products. Another con-
sequence is that the following relations and operations are sets (in U): 
identity I = {(x, y) : x = y}; membership E = {(x, y) : x E y}; 
singleton map S = {(x,{x}) : x is a set}; the pairing function: P = 
{(x,y,(x,y)): x,y are sets}; the union function Un= {(x,LJx): x is 
a set}; the powerset function P = {(x, Px) : x is a set}; the inclusion 
relation C = {( x, y) : x ~ y}; every class that includes the class of all 
non-hereditarily small sets( e.g.: the class of all non-wellfounded sets is 
a set!). 
6 Denotation of a Class 
As mentioned above, we only consider classes (and in particular pointed 
systems and modal theories) as ways of talking about sets. Classes are 
syntactic objects (predicates), which can be used to denote real objects, 
i.e. sets. We are trying to give a meaning, i.e. a denotation, to every 
definable class. 
The most straightforward, naive, notion of denotation is the literal 
denotation. A class is thought to denote itself, in case it is a set. A class 
C is said to have a literal denotation dlit ( C)if and only if C is a set. In 
this case, C denotes itself: dlit ( C) = C. 
Unfortunately, the literal denotation function is partial, because of 
the set-theoretical paradoxes: classes like the Russell class and the class 
of all ordinals cannot be sets, so they cannot have literal denotations. 
But nevertheless, SAFA gives us a way to assign a unique "generalized 
denotation" to every class. Namely, in STS, one can prove the following 
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proposition: 
Every class C is observationally equivalent to a unique set 
d(C). 
This is actually a particular case of Weak SAFA. We can explicitly 
define the denotation d(C) by d(C) =: th-1 (th(C)), where this the op-
erator sending sets to their modal theories and th- 1 is its inverse (which 
exists by the modal characterization principle, i.e. by Strong Exten-
sionality). The operator d will be called the generalized denotation (or 
simply the denotation) of C. Obviously, when C is a set, the generalized 
denotation coincides with the literal denotation: d( C) = dut ( C) = C. 
In the context of our system, the denotation of a class is the only 
object (set) which is observationally equivalent to that class. So the de-
notation function d provides us with an internal representative (inside 
the universe of sets) for every class. We also prove that the denotation 
of C can be seen as the closure C of the class C in a certain topol-
ogy. The existence of the denotation function provides an explanation 
for the classical set-theoretical paradoxes. In ZFC and ZF A, the para-
doxes were understood as proving that some classes, though definable, 
are nevertheless meaningless, since they do not denote any object. But 
the proper classes in STS, while not having a literal denotation, still 
have a meaning, given by their generalized denotation. The lesson of the 
paradoxes is that we can freely define sets-as-classes only up to obser-
vational equivalence. So the Comprehension Principle is limited only by 
the Strong Extensionality Principle: when we "form" or define a set d( C) 
by comprehension, denoting it by the class C = {x : P(x)} associated 
to a predicate P, we have only identified the set up to observational 
equivalence. There might be many classes observationally equivalent to 
C, and the denotation function picks only one of them to represent all. 
Denotation is preserved by observational equivalence. But this means 
that d( C) cannot be always equal to C itself (as for the literal denota-
tion), because distinct observationally equivalent classes must have the 
same denotation. The paradoxical classes are those classes C for which 
d(C) ::/=C. 
The classical set-theoretical paradoxes can be thus understood as 
paradoxes of denotation. This idea was proposed, in a slightly differ-
ent context, by Barwise and Moss in Vicious Circles (1996). The way 
we understand this proposal in ST S is by the generalized denotation 
function. The classical paradoxes prove that the denotation of a class 
cannot be always "literal". This is now explained by the fact that obser-
vational equivalence puts a restriction on our power to control the actual 
structure of the denotation of a class. In other words: our capacity to 
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define sets by predicates, or to unify classes into wholes, is subject to the 
limitations associated with our capacity to describe (observe) (in princi-
ple) the intended set. No definition can help us identify objects beyond 
the limits set by the relation of observational equivalence. The Naive 
Comprehension Principle is true modulo observational equivalence. The 
(generalized) denotation function gives us a canonical way to assign to 
each definable class some reference, which is an object reflecting all the 
infinitary modal properties of that class. 
Example: An Analysis of Burali-Forti's Paradox. As an example, 
take Burali-Forti's Paradox: the usual way to "solve" it is by saying that 
the paradoxical argument shows that the class On of all ordinals is not 
a set. This is still true in our setting, but now the same argument gives 
us more information. 
The Burali-Forti argument is based on the fact that the class On has 
all the properties of an ordinal, and so if On were a set than it would 
have to be an ordinal (and so it would belong to itself, contradicting its 
wellfoundedness). To obtain a simpler modal version of this argument, 
we introduce the following 
Definition 6.1 Two classes A, B are said to be equivalent with respect 
to a modal sentence 'P (or <p-equivalent) if we have: A I= <p iff B f= <p. In 
this case we write A ='P B. 
Next we show that "ordinals are more and more alike" from a modal 
point of view: 
Lemma 6.2 Given any (infinitary) modal sentence <p, there exists some 
ordinal a such that all ordinals bigger than a are <p-equivalent. 
Proof. Easy induction on the complexity of cp. We also remark that a 
can be taken to be the modal rank of the sentence a. -l 
As a consequence, "ordinals are more and more alike the class of all 
ordinals": 
Lemma 6.3 Given any sentence <p, there exists some ordinal a such 
that all ordinals bigger than a are <p-equivalent to On. 
Proof. Again, this is by induction on the complexity of <p. The essential 
step is for the Diamond O<p and uses the previous lemma. -l 
From this, we obtain the following 
Lemma 6.4 If On were a set, then it would be observationally equiv-
alent to On U {On}. Hence, by strong extensionality, we would have 
On= On U {On}, and so On E On, i.e. On would be itself an ordinal. 
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Proof. Observe that the hypothesis is necessary, since we can form the 
class On U {On} only if we assume that On is a set. 
We have to show that On = On U, {On}, i.e. that On ='P On U 
{On} for every modal sentence r.p. We prove this by induction on the 
complexity of r.p. Again, the essential step is the Diamond: suppose that 
On F Or.p, i.e. there exists some a E On s.t. a F r.p; then we also have 
a E On U {On}, so we obtain that also On U {On} F Or.p, as desired. 
Conversely, suppose that On U {On} F Or.p; then, by definition of modal 
satisfaction, we either have that it exists some a E On s.t. a F r.p (in 
which case we immediately obtain that On F Or.p and we are done) or 
that On F r.p. In the second case, we know, by the previous lemma, that 
it exists some a E On which is r.p-equivalent to On. Hence, from On F r.p, 
we conclude that also a F r.p. But a E On, so by the definition of modal 
satisfaction we obtain On F Or.p, as desired. -1 
Corollary 6.5 On is not a set. 
Proof. By definition, On is a subclass of V, so it is wellfounded. But, 
by the previous lemma, if On were a set then we would have On E On, 
which contradicts wellfoundedness. -1 
Clearly, this proof resembles Burali-Forti's argument. But it also gives 
more information: 
Theorem 6.6 The denotation d( On) of the class On is a reflexive set: 
d(On) E d(On) 
Proof. By definition, On = d(On); all the lemmas above are based on 
only the modal properties of On, which are the same as the modal prop-
erties of d(On). Hence, we can apply all the above arguments to d(On) 
instead of On, to conclude that: if d(On) were a set, then d(On) = 
d(On) U {On} and so d(On) E d(On). But, by definition, d(On) must 
indeed be a set, so we must have d(On) E d(On). (We do not have a 
contradiction anymore, since d( On) might as well be non-wellfounded. 
This theorem shows that d( On) is necessarily non-wellfounded.) -1 
The proof of this theorem can be further refined to give us the structure 
of the set d(On): 
Theorem 6.7 The denotation of the class On is a set d(On) with the 
following structure: 
d(On) =On U {d(On)}. 
So the final outcome of the Cantorian operations of successor and limit 
is a fixed point of these operations. The "largest ordinal" d( On) is a set 
that contains as members all the ordinals, and one more thing: itself. 
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Other Examples of Denotations of Paradoxical Classes 
• The denotation of the wellfounded universe: Let V be the class 
of all wellfounded sets. Then V is the least class which is a fixed 
point of the powerset operator: PV = V. But (by Mirimanoff's 
Paradox) V cannot be a set (since V is a wellfounded class, so if 
it were a set it would have to be a wellfounded set, and hence we 
would have V E V, which contradicts the wellfoundedness of V). 
One can show that its denotation is given by: 
d(V) = {d(C): Cs;; V} =VU {d(C): Cs;; Vis a proper class} 
As a consequence, d(V) is also a fixed point of the powerset oper-
ator: d(V) = Pd(V). One can show that it is actually the least set 
which is a fixed point of this operator. 
• The denotation of Aczel's universe: A set is said to be hereditarily 
small if all the sets in its transitive closure are small (or, equiva-
lently, if its transitive closure is itself small). The class H S of all 
hereditarily small classes is the natural model of Aczel's universe 
inside our theory. One can indeed prove that H S is a model of 
Z FA. By the Russel's paradox, H S cannot be a set, and one can 
easily see that its denotation is the "real" universe U: 
d(HS) = U 
So Aczel's universe H S of hereditarily small "hypersets" is obser-
vationally equivalent to, and yet distinct from, our reflexive uni-
verse U of "supersets"! (In the terms of the above discussion, H S is 
not really an object in itself, but just a class, i.e. a way of speaking 
about U). 
• The denotation of Russell's class: Let R = { x : x ff_ x} be the 
Russell's class. By the well-known diagonal argument, R cannot 
be a set. Its denotation turns out to be: 
d(R) = {x: x (j. x or x ff_ HS} =Ru (U \ HS). 
7 Topological and Closure Properties 
As mentioned above, Malitz, Weydert, Forti and Honsell , , have con-
structed a set-theoretical universe which is essentially isomorphic to our 
"canonical model" construction. Their construction is based on the intu-
ition that sets are closed classes, where "closed" should be understood as 
topological closure in an appropriate topology. We recover this topology 
in our axiomatic system by the following: 
Proposition 7.1 1. The denotation function for classes has all the 
properties of a topological closure operator. 
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2. A class C is a set if! it is closed in this topology. 
3. The topology given by denotation can be alternatively defined as be-
ing generated by the modal descriptions; i.e. a basis for this topol-
ogy is given by the family of all classes of the form { x : x f= tp}, 
where tp is an infinitary modal sentence. 
For this reason, we alternatively use the notation C for the denotation 
d( C) of the class C, and we call it the closure of C. The empty-set 0 and 
the universe U are their own closures, and so they are both sets. Closure 
permutes with arbitrary intersections, and as a result the universe of 
sets is closed under arbitrary intersections. Closure permutes with small 
union, and so the universe of sets is closed under small unions. 
Limits. The way hypersets in Z FA relate to wellfounded sets has been 
compared by many to the construction of the complex numbers from the 
reals or to the construction of the rational numbers (as pairs of integers). 
The way we described the sets in STS, using classes of wellfounded 
sets (modal theories), resembles the construction of the real numbers as 
classes of rationals. The analogy can be pursued by studying the notion 
of limit that comes with the topology induced by modal descriptions. I 
only mention briefly some definitions and some properties. 
Recall that two sets a, b are said to be equivalent with respect to a 
modal sentence <.p (write a ='P b) if we have: a f= cp iff bf= tp. 
Definition 7.2 Given an On-long sequence of sets indexed by ordinals 
(a0 )oEOn and a set a, we write limo-+oo a0 = a iff for every infinitary 
modal sentence <.p there exists some ordinal 8 E On such that for all 
a > 8 we have a0 ='P a. In this case we say the sequence is convergent. 
The sequence (a0 ) 0 eon is said to be Cauchy iff for every modal sentence 
tp there exists some ordinal 8 E On such that for all a, /3 > 8 we have 
a 0 ='P a13. 
As a consequence of SAFA, one can show that the universe U is com-
pact, as a topological space: 
Compactness and Completeness. Every On-long sequence of sets 
{a0 }aEOn has a convergent subsequence. As a consequence, every 
Cauchy sequence is convergent. 
Examples of Convergent Sequences 
1. the sequence of all ordinals has the denotation of "the largest or-
dinal" On as its limit 
lim a=: d(On) =On U {d(On)}. 
o-+oo 
2. the sequence of the classical iterative hierarchy of universes 
(Vo)aEOn1 defined as usual by Vo = u/><o 'P(Vp), converges to 
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the (above-described) denotation of the wellfounded universe V = 
lim v;,, = d(V). 
o:-+oc 
Properties of Limits 
1. The limit operator permutes with the following operations: single-
ton, powerset, binary union, infinitary union operator, Cartesian 
product. 
2. The following relations are preserved under limits: E, <;;;, f:=, :=.'P. 
3. If lirno-+oo a<> = a and <.p is a modal formula then the following are 
equivalent: 
(i) a F= <P 
(ii) 3o:V,3 > a: a13 I= <p 
(iii) Vo:38 > o a13 I= r.p 
This can be generalized to GP F00-formulas: 
Proposition 7.3 Suppose lima--+oo a0 = a and r.p(x) E GPF oo, such 
that \icdB > o: r.p(a0 ). Then we also have cp(a). 
Characterizations of Sets and Denotations. We can characterize 
the denotation d( C) of a class C in any of the following ways: 
• By definition, d( C) is the unique set which is observationally equiv-
alent to C. 
• d( C) is the closure C of C in the topology induced by modal de-
scriptions. 
• d(C) is the largest class observationally equivalent to C. 
• d( C) is the least set that includes C. It is the "best upper approx-
imation" of C inside the universe of sets. 
• An object is a member of d( C) if it cannot be distinguished from 
all the members of C by any modal formula; i.e. if it satisfies all 
the modal formulas true everywhere on C. 
As a result, we have the following characterizations of the notion of set: 
• A class is a set ifI it is closed in the topology given by the denotation 
function. So the universe of sets U coincides with the family of all 
its subclasses that are closed in this topology. 
• A class is a set iff it modally definable, i.e. it is of the form { x : 
x f= T}, for some modal theory T. 
• A class is a set iff it is maximal among all classes which are obser-
vationally equivalent to it. 
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Functions and Relations. We only mention a couple of results. 
Proposition 7.4 Let R ~ un be a class-relation. The fallowing are 
equivalent: 
1. Risa set 
2. R is defined by a G PF =-formula ip( X1, ... , Xn) 
3. R is closed as a class with the set topology {induced by the deno-
tation operator) on U 
4. R is closed in the product topology induced by the set topology on 
un 
5. R is closed under limits: if lim<>-+= a<>i = ai for every i E {1, 
... , n} and R(a"' 1 , .•. , a<>n) holds for every~, then R(a1, ... , an) 
holds. 
As an application, we get: 
Proposition 7.5 The universe of set-relations 
Rel = LJ P(Un) 
nEN 
is closed under the following operations: composition, inverse, restric-
tion to a set, cylindrifications, small unions, arbitrary intersections; the 
domain and codomain of a relation are sets. 
Given an equivalence set-relation R, any equivalence class [x]R is a 
set. For every set-relation R and every object a, the class of all prede-
cessors { x : xRa} and the class of all successors { x : aRx} of a are 
sets. 
Proposition 7.6 Let r : U -+ U be a class-function. The following 
are equivalent: 
1. r is a set 
2. the domain of r is a set and r is continuous in the set topology 
(defined by the denotation operator) 
3. the domain of r is a set and r is sequential-continuous, i. e. if 
limc.-+cxi aQ =a and all a"' 's are in the domain of r, then r(a) = 
limc.-+cxi r(a"') 
4. the domain of r is a set and r is uniformly continuous in the set 
topology. 
The Problem of the Exponential 
Definition 7. 7 Given two sets a, b, the exponential ab is the class of all 
functions having b as domain and a as codomain: 
ab =: {!: f is a function: b-+ a}. 
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Theorem 7 .8 (Forti) ab is a set iff b is small. 
So, unlike most other set-theoretical operations, the exponential is not 
always defined: our universe of sets U is not closed under this operation. 
There is no set uu of all total functions; moreover, there is no set U _. U 
of all partial functions. Even worse, the exponential does not exist except 
in the trivial case in which the exponent is small. So we have to look for 
substitutes for exponentiation. 
Our proposal is to restrict our attention to a particular class of func-
tions f : U --+ U, that we call bounded functions. We will not for-
mally define this notion here, since the definition is rather long and 
involves some complex technical notions that we have decided to skip 
here. It suffices to say that almost all interesting set-theoretical oper-
ators on U are bounded (e.g. identity, singleton a ..-..-+ {a}, powerset 
a f-t Pa, binary union (a, b) --+ a U b, set-union a ..-..-+ U a, domain 
a f-t dom(a) = {x : 3y s.t. (x, y) E a}, codomain, Cartesian product, 
permutations, projections, transitive closure, rank ) and that all the 
functions used outside set theory, in classical mathematics (e.g. group 
homorphisms) can be assumed to be bounded. Also, the composition of 
two bounded functions and the restriction of a bounded function to a 
set are bounded. 
--·-·- ·----- -
Theorem 7.9 For all sets a, b, the class of all total {or partial} bounded 
functions from a to b is a set. 
We propose the latter as a good enough approximation of the exponen-
tial. 
Definition 7.10 For sets a, b, define the bounded exponential to be the 
set of all bounded (i.e bounded by id+ w) functions from b to a. We use 
both the set-theoretical notation expbd(a, b) and the domain-theoretic 
notation b -+bd a to denote the bounded exponential. We also consider 
the set of all bounded partial functions from b to a and we denote it by 
b -"-bd a. 
The set Bdf =: U -'-bd U = Ua,b expbd(a, b) is the set of all bounded 
functions. It coincides with the set of all restrictions to sets of the func-
tions in U -+bd U. 
The (bounded) exponential operator exp : U x U ---+ U is defined by: 
exp( a, b) =: b -+bd a. The bounded application operator app is a partial 
function on Bdf x U, such that app(f, x) =: f(x), whenever x E dom(f). 
We have seen that a lot of set-theoretical functions are bounded. Now 
we can add more: 
Proposition 7.11 The {bounded} exponential operator expbd is bound-
ed (and hence is a function). The bounded application operator is bound-
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ed (and hence is a function). The composition operator restricted to 
bounded functions Comp : Bdf x Bdf ~ Bdf, given by Com(!, g) = 
fog, is bounded. The inverse operator restricted to boundedly injective 
functions is bounded. The bounded symmetric group Sbda of any set a is 
indeed a group, if considered with the composition and inverse operators. 
So the notions of "bounded function" and "bounded exponential" seem 
to be very well-behaved approximations of their unbounded versions. 
The bounded exponential contains most natural set-theoretical func-
tions. Moreover, as we shall see in the section on Applications in model 
theory, one can show that all the functions used outside set-theory will 
have bounded "copies": every first-order structure is isomorphic to a 
"bounded" structure (endowed only with bounded functions). 
8 Applications 
Fixed Point Theorems: Recursion and Corecursion 
Definition 8.1 A monotonic class-operator is a class-function, i.e. a 
functional class r of pairs, with the property that: x s;;; y ==> r(x) s;;; 
I'(y). A fixed point in U (or a set-fixed point) of the operator r is a set 
x such that r(x) = x. 
Note that every monotonic class-operator r can be extended in a canon-
ical manner to an operator on classes, by putting r(C) =: LJ{r(x) : 
x is a set E U and x ~ C} and the resulting operator is still monotonic: 
x ~ y ==> r(x) ~ r(y). By extension, we can say that a class X is a 
fixed point of r if r(X) = X. (Of course, such a fixed point might not 
be in U, so it might not be a set-fixed point. 
Proposition 8.2 If r : U --+ U is a monotonic operator then r has a 
least {set-)fixed point I' 00 E U and a greatest (set-)fixed point roo E U. 
Proposition 8.3 If r : U --+ U is a monotonic operator, then: 
l. (The extension of) r (to classes) has a least class-fixed point lfp(r) 
and a greatest class-fixed point gfp(I'). 
2. roo=n{x:rx~x} 
3. r 00 = gfp(I') = LJ{x: x ~ rx}. 
This means that the largest fixed point inside our universe of sets is the 
real one: 
Corollary 8.4 The largest {class-)fixed point of a monotonic operator 
is always a set. 
This is not true for least fixed points, e.g. for the powerset operator: 
lfp('P) = V, while P00 = d(V) i= V. So, in general, the greatest fixed 
point is better-behaved than the least fixed point. 
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For monotonic functions, one can construct both the least and the 
greatest :fixed points in On steps: 
Theorem 8.5 Let r E U, r : U -+ U be a monotonic set-junction. 
Define by recursion on ordinals: 
U r (f 13), 
f3<a 
Then: 
i. tfp(r) = UQ r Q 
2. r 00 = d(lfp(f)) = limQ__,00 r a 
3. r 00 = gf p(f) = n. ra = lima~oo fC>. 
Example: Take f to be the powerset operator P. This is a monotonic 
operator, and it is a set in our universe. The approximations r Q are 
the standard universes Va of the iterative hierarchy; the least class-fixed 
point ljp(f) is the wellfounded universe V, while the least set-fixed point 
is the denotation d(V) of the wellfounded universe. Aczel's universe of 
all hereditarily small sets HS is also a class-fixed pointof this operator. 
But the largest fixed point f 00 = gfp(f) is the universal set U, and in 
case it is reached in just one approximation step, since r 0 = fC> = U 
for all a. 
We can see that, for monotonic set-functions, the natural recursive 
process of approximation of the fixed points converges in at most On 
steps. The reason this recursive process converges to a fixed point is not 
that the recursion would close off at some ordinal (as in ZFC). Our 
set-function r might be large (e.g. the powerset function P), in which 
case no ordinal will suffice. But, as long as r is a set, the recursive 
process will reach a fixed point in On steps. Another interesting thing is 
that, unlike in the case of ZFC and ZF A, our theory relates recursion 
and corecursion in a simple, symmetrical manner: given a monotonic 
operator on sets, one can approximate the greatest fixed point by a 
descending sequence, dual to the one that approximates the least fixed 
point. This is only possible because of the presence of very large, "over-
comprehensive" sets, which nevertheless remain "well-behaved" from a 
set-theoretical point of view. 
Domain Equations 
In the semantics of programming languages, one needs to solve reflexive 
domain equations of the following form: 
X = F(X). 
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Usually, F is assumed to be built by composing elementary operations, 
like union, Cartesian product, powerset, exponential etc. There are sev-
eral known approaches to this problem: Scot,t domains, de Bakker-Rutt-
en metric domains etc. In all of them, the "real" operations of powerset 
and exponentiation are replaced by "internal" operators. This is because 
of the size barrier imposed by Cantor's theorem: in ZFC (and ZF A) we 
always have IAI < IPAI and !Al < !BAI (for IBI > 2). This barrier has 
been lifted from our theory, which makes possible to find ''real" solutions 
to reflexive equations. (This has already been observed by Forti, in the 
frame of his "hyperuniverses".) 
Indeed, our fixed point above can be used to solve equations of 
the form X = F(X), for functions F composed of: binary (and small) 
unions, set-unions, powersets P, Cartesian product, inverse x-1 , domain 
dom(X), codomain cod(X), relational composition X o Y, projections, 
image operator, bounded exponentiation with a fixed base B -+bd X, 
bounded partial exponentiation X ~bd Y . All these operators are 
monotonic functions in our universe, and so their compositions are also 
monotonic functions. 
Some Examples: If A, B are sets then the following equations have 
solutions X that are sets: 
x = PX (both d(V) and U are solutions) 
x AUP(B x X) 
x = P(A x x-1) 
x = Au (B-+bd X) 
x = x~bdx 
x = AU (X -'-bd X) 
x = X o (AU (Bx X)) 
Model Theory 
In this subsection we explore some elementary notions of model theory 
inside STS. We plan to develop the subject in a future paper. 
Ta.rski's Paradox: The Universal Model. One can formalize model 
theory inside our system ST S, in the usual manner, defining the notion 
of a model M for a given language L. The only problem is to define the 
satisfaction relation. As we shall see, there cannot be a unique formula 
in ST S, to define truth or satisfaction of an arbitrary sentence in an 
arbitrary model. But one can define a formula Satn that defines satis-
faction for formulas of complexity length n. Satn is a ternary relation 
between models, formulas and valuation, which we shall usually write 
as M f= rp[v]. The definition is by induction on n, with the obvious 
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inductive clauses, starting with: 
MI= R(x1 ... xn)[v] {::::=>: (v(x1), ... ,v(x~),) E dM(R), 
for formulas of complexity 0, etc. We write informally M I= cp[v], and 
that "cp is satisfied (or true) in the model M by the valuation v" , when-
ever we have M l=n cp[v] for n = lh(cp) being the complexity length of <p. 
But we should keep in mind that this is not a first-order formula in ST S, 
but a metatheoretic device to refer to a disjunction of infinitely many 
formulas. For particular classes of models (e.g. small models), this is 
actually equivalent to some first-order formula. But not in general. One 
can check that all the usual ways to make this inductive definition into 
a single formula fail in our setting, because of the failure of Separation 
and Replacement for "large" models. 
Given a theory T, i.e. a set of (codes of) sentences in first-order 
logic, we say that "M is a model of the theory T" if M I= cp for every 
cp ET. Again, this is not a definable formula in STS, but a metaformula. 
Nevertheless, we can still use it. 
In particular, we can take now the language of set theory L = 
(Var, E) and we can write the set of (codes of) axioms for STS. We shall 
also denote this theory by STS. Notice that STS is an infinite system 
·---·ofaxioms, since we have stated it using axiom schemes. This is similar 
to the case of Zermelo's ZFC. We can consider models M = (M, R) of 
this language, with M some arbitrary set and RE 'P(M2 ). And then we 
can prove the following interesting theorem: 
Theorem 8.6 {Strong Reflection Theorem for STS) The theory 
STS has a model. Namely the set (U, E) is a model of our theory. 
This seems to contradict Tarski's theorem. In reality, it does not: we 
cannot use it to define truth inside the system as "satisfaction in (U, E)", 
because we have not defined any single satisfaction relation. But then 
what is the content of the Strong Reflection Theorem? 
· Recall that Z FC had also infinitely many axioms. In Z FC there is a 
single definable "satisfaction relation"' but no single internal model; by 
the Reflection Theorems, there were infinitely many "partial internal" 
models, for any given finite subset of the axioms. The situation in ST S 
is completely dual: there is a single internal model for all the axioms, but 
no definable general notion of satisfaction; but for every n we can define 
a formula Satn, which gives the satisfaction relation for all formulas of 
complexity less than n; the definition looks pretty uniform from outside 
the system (it is an induction), and it is clear that it agrees with the 
external, meta-theoretical, notion of satisfaction for all formulas of lower 
complexity. But there is no way to write it in a uniform way inside the 
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system. 
So the actual content of the above Theorem is a schema saying that: 
For each finite subset T of the axioms of STS, let n be some (externally 
given) natural number, larger than the complexity of all the sentences in 
T. Then we have (U, E) Fn /\ T. 
So we conclude that the system ST S has the interesting property 
that it provides a definable model for itself. This model can be seen to 
be a model from inside the theory: the system can prove that each of 
its axioms holds in the universal model (U, E).What the system cannot 
do is to say that the universal model is a model of all its axioms; and 
this is because there is no uniform notion of "satisfaction (truth) of an 
arbitrary formula in a model". 
Sets of Models of a Given Theory. We would like to have the 
classes of models M od(T) of important first-order theories T as sets in 
our universe. For purely relational languages, this is possible: 
The class of all models of a relational language (no functions) 
is a set. 
But it is clear that we cannot expect the functional languages to have the 
same property, because of the problems with the exponential operator. 
So we need to restrict ourselves to bounded models. 
Definition 8. 7 A model is bounded if the interpretations of all the 
function-symbols are bounded functions. We denote by M odbd(T) the 
class of all models of the theory T. 
It is easy to see that, by restricting ourselves to bounded models, we do 
not lose anything from the model-theoretic point of view, as far as small 
models are concerned: 
Proposition 8.8 Given a small model M, there exists a bounded model 
isomorphic to M. Moreover, there exist many such isomorphic copies: 
the class of all bounded models which are isomorphic to M is large. 
Proposition 8.9 By EPF 00 -Comprehension, the following classes of 
models are sets: 
1. the set of all bounded models of a given signature; 
2. the set of all bounded models of an equational theory; 
3. the set of all bounded models of a positive theory. Here a "posi-
tive theory" is a theory whose formulas are built from atoms of the 
form Rt1 ... tn and ti = tz (equations), using conjunction, dis-
junction, quantifiers V, 3 and bounded universal quantifiers of the 
form '<lx1 ... Xn(Rx1 ... Xn -t ... ) {but no negation). 
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Examples: the set of all bounded monoids, the set of all bounded groups, 
the set of all bounded rings, the set of all bol,lnded vector spaces, the set 
of all bounded lattices (defined in terms of join and meet, not as partial 
orders), the set of all bounded Boolean algebras, the set of all binary 
(pointed) graphs (Kripke structures). 
Observe that these sets of models contain copies of all the small 
models of the given type, but also large natural models: the model (U, ~) 
belongs to the last set above; the models (U, U), (U, x) are bounded 
monoids etc. 
Unfortunately, the definitions of important notions like "field" and 
"integral domain" involve negative assertions (e.g. "O '# 1"). But in 
such cases, the negativity is eliminable, by simply fixing some of the 
constants. If, for instance, we agree to consider only fields or integral 
domains having the empty set 0 as the zero element 0, then the classes 
of these algebraic structures are sets. 
Category Theory 
A well-known problem in the foundations of category theory is to find 
a way to make sense of "large categories" (e.g. the category of all sets) 
and of "super-large, reflexive categories" (e.g. the category of all cat-
egories). Both are forbidden by the limitation-of-size assumption built 
into ZFC and ZFA. The second case (reflexive categories) is completely 
intractable in Z FC. The first case (large categories) is tractable in an 
indirect way, by using classes; nevertheless, this treatment makes impos-
sible some natural categorial constructions on large categories: e.g only 
for small categories A, B, we are able to define the exponential category 
(A, B] (having as objects all functors F from A to B, as morphisms 
from F to G all natural transformations from F to G, as identities the 
identity natural transformations, and as composition the composition 
of natural transformations). For large categories, the exponential cate-
gory is said to be illegitimate. Sometimes, these problems are solved by 
adding to ZFC one more layer of objects ("families") on top of "classes" 
::;_,_ and "sets". A natural thing to do would be to add transfinitely many 
·· more layers, and assuming they also satisfy the axioms of ZFC; this is 
equivalent to asserting the existence of an inaccessible cardinal in ZFC. 
But of course, this only lifts the problem, without actually solving it. In 
·particular, there will be no "reflexive" categories (i.e. categories which 
are among their own "objects") in any such set theory. 
We present here an attempt to to deal with these problems inside our 
theory . The resulting category theory will be universal with respect to 
its objects, but it will be restricted with respect to its morphisms: only 
bounded functions are allowed as morphisms and functors. 
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Definition 8.10 A bounded category is a sextuple A= (0, hom, id, o, 
dom, cod), consisting of: 
1. a set 0, whose members are called A-objects; 
2. a bounded function horn : 0 x 0 -t U; the members of each 
hom(A, B) are called A-morphisms from A to B; 
3. a bounded function id: 0 -t U, such that id(A) E hom(A, A) for 
every object A E O; the morphism id(A) will be denoted by idA 
and called the A-identity on A; 
4. a bounded binary partial function o (composition), such that, for 
all A-objects A, B, C and for all A-morphisms f E hom(A, B),g E 
hom(B, C), the function o is defined and go f E hom(A, C); the 
morphism g o f is called the composite of f and g; 
5. bounded partial functions dom and cod, defined on all A-mor-
phisms into the set 0 of objects; the object dom(f) is called the 
domain off, while cod(!) is called the codomain of f. 
The above sets and functions are required to satisfy the following equa-
tions: 
(a) composition is associative: ho (go J) =(hog) of, whenever both 
are defined; 
(b) A-identities act as identities with respect to composition: idB of = 
f and f o idA = f, for every f E hom(A, B); 
(c) dom(J) =A and cod(!)= B, for every f E hom(A, B). 
Observation: By EPF 00-Comprehension, the class of all bounded cate-
gories Cat is a set. 
Examples. The {bounded} category of all sets Set (having sets as ob-
jects 0 = U, bounded partial functions as morphisms hom(A, B) = 
expbd(B, A) = A --'b dB, functional composition as composition o, the 
identity function on A as the identity idA and the functional domain 
and codomain as its dom and cod functions); the category of all bounded 
groups Grp (having bounded groups as objects and bounded group homo-
morphisms as its morphisms); the category of vector spaces Vect (with 
vector spaces as objects and bounded linear maps as morphisms); the 
category of bounded topological spaces Top (with bounded topological 
spaces as objects and bounded continuous functions as morphisms). 
Note that all these "large" categories are members of the set Cat of 
all bounded categories. 
Definition 8.11 If A and B are bounded categories, then a bounded 
functor from A to B is a bounded function F that assigns to each A-
object A some B-object F(A) and to each A-morphism f E hom(A, A') 
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sorne B-morphism F(f) E hom(F(A), F(A')), in such a way that: F 
preserves composition and identities: F(f o g) = F(f) o F(g), F(idA) = 
· ... ··.· idF(A)· . 
Most natural functors between bounded categories are bounded func-
tors: e.g. the forgetful functor, the identity functor, the (covariant and 
contravariant) ham-functors, the (covariant and contravariant) power-
set functors etc. 
Definition 8.12 The category of all bounded categories Cat has as ob-
jects all the bounded categories, as morphisms from A to B all the 
·bounded functors from A to B, and as composition the usual composi-
tion of functors. 
Proposition 8.13 The category Cat contains as objects all the above-
mentioned categories Set, Grp, Vect, Top, Cat. In particular, Cat is 
a reflexive category: Cat E Ocat is an object of itself. 
One can go on and define a notion of bounded natural transformation 
between bounded functors, and define the bounded exponential category 
[A, BJ, for any two bounded categories A, B. 
. - Games and Semantical Paradoxes 
[.:.We. are currently exploring the possible treatments inside our universe 
' · of sets of the classical semantical paradoxes (e.g. the Liar), epistemic 
paradoxes and game-theoretic paradoxes (e.g. the so-called Hypergame 
paradox, see Barwise and Moss (1996) for a good presentation and a 
treatment inside Z FA). 
Hypergame is the game with two players, in which the first move of 
player A is to choose any well-founded game G (i.e. a game in which every 
;.- play ends necessarily in finitely many steps), and then they just play the 
game G with player B as the first player. The paradox is generated by 
the question whether hypergame is a wellfounded game or not. The 
solution of the paradox inside both Z FC and Z FA theories is that 
· hypergame simply does not exist, because of size-restrictions: the class 
of all wellfounded games is not a set, and hence cannot constitute the 
set of all possible first-moves of player A. The solution in our theory is 
more subtle: hypergame, as defined above, still doesn't exist, but there 
exists a very close approximation of it, which can be understood as its 
denotation or closure d(hypergame). The set of first-moves for player 
A is the denotation of the class of all well-founded games (what one 
might call the set of quasi-wellfounded games). This game d(hypergame) 
is itself quasi-wellfounded, but not well-founded (since it is one of its 
own possible first-moves: A can simply choose G = d(hypergame)). The 
relation between the ( "inexistent") hypergame and its denotation, the 
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"real" game d(hypergame) is similar to the relation between the well-
founded universe V and its denotation d(V). 
A similar solution can be given to Lfar-like paradoxes. The class 
False of all false propositions is not a set, but just a class. Its denota-
tion d(False) is a set though, the set of all "almost false" propositions. 
The Liar sentence, as such, is not a well-defined "proposition", since 
it is meaningless (or paradoxical, or having only a context-dependent 
meaning, as in Barwise and Etchemendy (1987)). But there exists a 
closely related sentence d(Liar), which is not paradoxical; this is the 
sentence d(Liar) =: "d(Liar) is almost false". This turns out to be a 
meaningful proposition. Moroever, this proposition d(Liar) is true! 
9 Conclusions and Comparisons 
This paper is an attempt to build a set theory on a purely structural 
view on the concept of set. Our work was inspired and builds on the 
results and of Barwise and Moss (1996) and Aczel (1988). As we men-
tioned, our model for the universe of sets turned out to be isomorphic 
to the one obtained by and Forti and Hinnion (1989), as a model for 
the Generalized Positive Comprehension Principle. But their construc-
tion is just a topological construction, for which they do not provide any 
intuitive set-theoretical (or philosophical) justification. They have some 
proposals for axioms (of a topological fl.avor), but these axioms are nei-
ther intuitive, nor sufficient to derive all the important properties of the 
model. They only prove these properties (included some of the results 
mentioned in this paper) in the meta-theory. 
In contrast, we present an axiomatic system, based on and justified by 
our intuitions about the notions of set, structure, modal description and 
observational equivalence. We propose an analytical picture, in which 
objects are analyzed in stages and all we can know about them are their 
successive partial structural descriptions, given by modal sentences. A set 
is what is left from this process of analysis: it is the trace of unfolding 
of some possible object, given by a maximally consistent class of partial 
descriptions. In fact, sets can be identified with the maximally consistent 
theories that characterize them. In this sense, a set is a canonical possible 
world, in the sense of the canonical model for modal logic. Sets can also 
be understood as modally definable classes. 
We have a notion of observational equivalence between structures, 
defined as identity of description, i.e. modal equivalence. Sets can be 
understood as arbitrary (pointed binary) structures modulo observational 
equivalence. As collections, sets are closed, completed classes, which are 
as large as their modal description allows them. They contain every 
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object which cannot be distinguished (separated) from all their elements 
by any modal property. 
Our system STS of set-theoretical axioms is powerful enough to for-
m.ally derive all the results about "hyperuniverses", discovered byForti 
and others. In our axiomatic frame, we recover their results, and we also 
present some new ones (including the applications on category theory 
and model theory). The universe of STS has nice fixed-point and closure 
properties. Recursion and corecursion are related in a simpler manner 
over this universe than over Aczel's hyperset universe. Some category-
theory notions can be stated as objects (sets), not just as classes. As 
already observed by Forti, this universe provides solutions to domain 
equations, which could be used as frameworks for denotational seman-
tics. ST S belongs to circular model theory, in the sense that it contains 
·its own model as an object. For this reason, STS seems to be a good 
candidate for a general framework to study semantical paradoxes, in the 
spirit of the "circular-model approach" theory of Situation Theory (see 
Barwise 1987 and 1996). 
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